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The Response to Furman:
Can Legislators Breathe Life Back into Death?
N THE EIGHTEEN MONTHS since the Supreme Court of the United
States struck down capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia'
twenty-three states have reinstated the death penalty. While the Su-
preme Court has not yet heard arguments concerning the constitu-
tionality of these statutes, their validity will determine the fate of
the forty-four persons currently awaiting execution in eight states.2
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the statutes reinstating
capital punishment, in light of Furman.
Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court first directly attempted to interpret the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause, which is found in the eighth
amendment, in 1878 when it considered the validity of a sentence of
public execution by shooting in Wilkerson v. Utah.4 While the Court
did not seriously consider whether a particular method of execution fell
within the ambit of the eighth amendment, it did indicate that execu-
tion by shooting was not included in the category of cruel and unusual
punishment.5
Eleven years later, the Court considered executions by electro-
cution as possible violations of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments in In re Kemmler.6 The Court held that the:
S.. enactment of this statute was in itself within the legiti-
mate sphere of the legislative power of the state . . . ; we
cannot perceive that the State has thereby abridged the
privileges or immunities of the petitioner or deprived him
of due process of law. 7
Kemmler stands primarily for the proposition that a punishment
which is unusual may nevertheless be constitutional if the legislature
had a humane purpose in selecting it.8
1408 U.S. 238 (1972). [Hereinafter cited as Furman).
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973, §1 at 19, col. 1. There are twenty-one persons awating execution
in North Carolina, eight in Florida, five in Georgia, five in Massachusetts, two in Montana,
one in Utah, one in Virginia, and one in Pennsylvania.
3408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972).
499 U.S. 130 (1878).
5 ld. at 135., ,
6 136 U.S. 436 (.1889).-
7 Id. at 449.
8408 U.S. 238, 323 (1972). "
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In O'Neil v. Vermont,9 the majority held the eighth amendment
did not apply to the states. But three dissenting Justices would not
only have held that it was applicable to the states but also that the
inhibition was directed "against all punishments which by their ex-
cessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the offense
charged." 10 Nine years later in Howard v. Fleming," the Court essen-
tially followed the approach of the O'Neil minority by considering
the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, and the length of the
sentence imposed. Utilizing this approach, the Court rejected a claim
that a ten year sentence for conspiracy to defraud was cruel and
unusual.
In Weems v. United States 2 the Court utilized the same approach
as earlier enunciated by the O'Neil minority when it held that where:
... a crime which may cause the loss of many thousands of
dollars ... is not greater than that which may be imposed
for falsifying a single item of a public account . . . It con-
demns the sentence ... as cruel and unusual. 13
The Weems decision was of paramount importance because it was the
first instance where the Supreme Court found a punishment cruel and
unusual.
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber 14 the electric chair mal-
functioned and did not kill a convicted murderer. Appeal was sought
to prevent a second attempt at execution on the grounds that it would
be cruel and unusual punishment. The entire Court agreed with the
O'Neil minority that infliction of unnecessary pain was prohibited,
but there was a five-to-four split on whether the appellant would be
forced to undergo any excessive pain. The majority adhered to
Kemmler, declaring that the legislative purpose in adopting electro-
cution was humane and as such should not be thwarted even if it may
inadvertently increase pain in one case. 15
Trop v. Dulles16 considered "whether denationalization is a cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amend-
ment."'17 An amended law had given military authorities "complete
discretion to decide who among convicted deserters shall continue to
' 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
'Id. at 339, 340.
11 Howard V. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
12217 U.S. 349 (1910).
131d. at 381.
14329 U.S. 459 (1947).
15Id.
16 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
17Id. at 99.
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be Americans and who shall be stateless."' 18 The flexibility inherent
in the words "cruel and unusual" was emphasized by Chief Justice
Warren when he indicated that "[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."' 19 Three other members of the Court
agreed that loss of citizenship for a conviction of wartime desertion
was cruel and unusual. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred on other
grounds and the penalty was struck down.
In 1962 a majority did agree that a sentence of 90 days imprison-
ment for violation of a statute making narcotic addiction itself a crime
was cruel and unusual.20 The majority reiterated Warren's opinion in
Trop when it indicated that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
was not a static concept, but one that must be continually re-examined
"in light of contemporary human knowledge. '21
A due process alternative to the eighth amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause was used to successfully challenge the im-
position of a capital sentence by a "death qualified" jury in Weather-
spoon v. Illinois.22 In that instance the statute excluded persons who
expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punish-
ment or opposed it in principle. The Court held that such exclusions
denied defendant a trial by a jury which reflected the views of a
cross-section of the community.
Subsequently, the "due process" approach was jettisoned when
the Court decided McGautha v. California.23 The Court refused to
invalidate a death penalty imposed by a bifurcated trial system which
had no standards a jury could follow in its determination of whether
or not to impose a capital sentence. The Court rejected the contention
that there was a violation of due process, saying that it was "...
quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion
of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is
offensive to anything in the Constitution."2' By thus precluding further
use of the due process clause argument the Court forced subsequent
litigants who opposed capital punishment to rely upon the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
18 Id. at 90.
9 Id. at 101.
20 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
21 Id. at 666.
- 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
-402 U.S. 183 (1971).
2402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971).
[Vol. 23:172
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The Decision and the Opinions
It was in this context that the Supreme Court heard Furman v.
Georgian wherein appellants had been convicted of murder and rape,
and had been sentenced to death under Georgia and Texas statutes.
In reversing the sentences, the majority held that "the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments."2 6
Though the majority's decision was but a single paragraph, the
Court was far from agreement upon the underlying rationale. Not only
did four members of the Court dissent, but each of the five members of
the majority wrote a separate opinion in support of the decision.
The Majority: Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and White
For the majority Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded di-
rectly that the death penalty is cruel and unusual. Justice Mar-
shall, in a lengthy opinion, indicated that capital punishment is
excessive because it does not operate as a deterrent and is morally un-
acceptable to the people of the United States measured by how they
would react if they knew all the statistics concerning capital punish-
ment.27 Marshall found capital punishment violative of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. He indicated that he found the follow-
ing punishments cruel and unusual: those involving so much physical
pain and suffering that civilized people can not tolerate them; un-
usual punishments, i.e., ones previously unknown as penalties for a
given offense; excessive punishments serving no legitimate legislative
purpose; and those punishments abhorrent to public policy although
serving a valid legislative purpose and not excessive. Marshall main-
tained that the death penalty violated the last two criteria and hence
was cruel and unusual. Furthermore, he asserted that none of the
purposes allegedly served by capital punishment justified its reten-
tion. He concluded that punishment solely for the sake of retribution
is not permissible under the eighth amendment and that opponents
of capital punishment have amply demonstrated that capital punish-
ment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society. Addi-
tionally, he indicated that since most murderers are first offenders,
capital punishment is clearly excessive as a means of preventing
recidivism. Finally, he concluded that there is no merit in the use of
capital punishment to encourage guilty pleas and confessions, for
eugenics, or to reduce state expenditures. 28 Marshall therefore deter-
-408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972).
2Id. at 239-40.
2 Id. at 342-69.
2Id. at 343-58.
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minded that capital punishment has no rational basis and that further
deference to the legislatures is an abdication of the court's role as
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. Public opinion polls notwith-
standing, he also found capital punishment morally unacceptable to
the American people not because capital punishment in the abstract
shocks people's conscience or sense of justice, but rather because it
is unacceptable to people who are fully informed as to its purposes
and liabilities. 29 Since he felt the time in United States history had
arrived for the total abolition of capital punishment,3 it is highly
unlikely that he will find capital punishment acceptable in any form.
Justice Brennan reached the same conclusion as Marshall by
utilizing the following test to determine whether punishment is cruel
and unusual:
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a
punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected
by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe
that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some
less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that
punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State
may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon
those convicted of crimes.30
Applying this test, he concluded that "death today is a 'cruel and
unusual' punishment. ' 31 In distinguishing the death penalty from other
punishments, Justice Brennan noted that severity is based upon sev-
eral factors, pain being merely one such factor, and that no other
punishment so denies the humanity of the persons punished. 32 Further-
more, the strong probability that death is arbitrarily imposed, he
maintained, can be seen from the infrequency of its imposition, that
it is not an ordinary punishment for any crime, and that it is inflicted
only in a few cases when it is available. 33 To buttress his position,
Brennan focused upon society's growing opposition to the death
penalty as evidenced by the declining number of crimes for which it
is a punishment; the fact that executions are no longer being publicly
performed; the use of more humane methods of execution; and finally,
the abolition of capital punishment in nine states and extreme re-
striction in five others. Based on these facts he concluded that "Re-
jection could hardly be more complete without becoming absolute. At
the very least, I must conclude that contemporary society views this
291d. at 369-69.
30 Ld. at 282.
31 Id. at 286.
32Id. at 287-90.
3id. at 291-95.
(Vol. 23 :172
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punishment with substantial doubt." Brennan also utilized the same
deterrence approach as Marshall, noting that there is no evidence
that the threat of death is a greater deterrent than the possibility of
imprisonment especially since its infrequent use has substantially
diluted its threat.35
It is thus apparent that Brennan presented strong factual evidence
to support the presence of all four elements of the test he outlined
for use in determining whether a punishment is prohibited by the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. 36 The refutation of at least one
of these factual patterns would be necessary to change his opinion in
a subsequent capital punishment restoration appeal.
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White did not reach a decision as
to the constitutionality, of capital punishment itself. Rather, they
focused their attention upon, and found objection in, its application.
Justice Douglas found the death penalty cruel and unusual when
. it discriminates against [any person] by reason of his race,
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." 37 Further-
more, Douglas implied that a nondiscriminatory application of capital
punishment would pass constitutional muster when he indicated that:
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment is to require legislatures
to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and
nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively and spottily to un-
popular groups.3
Similarly, Justice Stewart found it "unnecessary to reach the
ultimate question [other Justices] would decide" 3 as to the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment. He, too, found objection to the death
penalty in its arbitrary administration.
I simply conclude that the eighth and fourteenth amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wan-
tonly and freakishly imposed.4 0
Id. at 300.
1 Id. at 302.
36 Id. at 282-306.
37 Id. at 242.
Id. at 256.
39 Id. at 306.
40Id. at 310.
1974]
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Justice Stewart's opinion implies that a nondiscriminatory, manda-
tory death penalty would not be constitutionally prohibited as long as
society's interest in retribution and deterrence outweighed consider-
ations of reform and rehabilitation of the criminal. 41 Stewart acknowl-
edged the strength of Brennan's and Marshall's arguments against
capital punishment but indicated that such arguments were pre-
mature since none of the cases at bar involved a statute with a man-
datory death penalty.4 2
Taking a slightly different approach, Justice White concurred
largely on the basis of his observations that the death penalty is so
infrequently imposed that it has lost its value both for deterrent and
retributive purposes. He indicated that while Brennan's and Mar-
shall's arguments were able, he could not reach the conclusion in this
case that capital punishment itself was unconstitutional or that there
is no system of capital punishment that could comport with the eighth
amendment. 3
The Dissent: Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist
Like the majority, each of the dissenting members of the Court
wrote a separate opinion analyzing the constitutional questions in-
volved in capital punishment. Chief Justice Burger viewed infrequent
imposition of the death penalty by juries as a refinement rather than
as a repudiation of capital punishment.M In his dissent, the Chief
Justice briefly considered possible legislative reaction to the deci-
sion. The determination of meaningful standards for the imposition
of capital punishment was thought impossible in McGautha, he as-
serted, and even if standards could be devised, "there is little reason
to believe that [they] . . . will substantially alter the discretionary
character of the prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases.
45
The only real change would be brought under a system having death
or acquittal as the only alternatives and Burger indicated that
such a system would be so arbitrary and doctrinaire as to be
unconstitutional.4 6
A different approach is taken by Justice Blackmun. His dissent
is somewhat qualified: "Were I legislator, I would vote against the
death penalty. 47 His dissent is founded upon his objection to aboli-
tion of capital punishment for such crimes as treason, assassination,
and aircraft piracy.U
41 Id. at 307.
42 Id. at 306-07.
43 Id. at 310-314.
MId. at 387.
45Id. at 401.
46Id.
7 Id. at 406.
4Id. at 405-14.
[Vol. 23 :172
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Justice Powell, on the other hand, found the majority's opinion
on capital punishment to be an invasion of the legislative preroga-
tive.4 1 He also concluded that there is nothing in the death penalty
which is offensive to the fifth, fourteenth, or eighth amendments. He
rejected Douglas's discrimination arguments, indicating that the
lower classes have always made up a high percentage of those com-
mitting crimes and that if the death penalty discriminates against the
lower classes, so does every other criminal sentence.50
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist believed the majority had made an
unwarranted extension of the fourteenth amendment and had seri-
ously invaded the federal checks and balances system by failing to
exercise judicial restraint.5'
Thus, while there was a majority of five willing to reverse the
death sentences in Furman, there were only two Justices, Marshall
and Brennan, who concluded that capital punishment itself was
unconstitutional because it was a violation of the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The three
remaining members of the majority, Stewart, Douglas, and White,
found that capital punishment was being applied in a discriminatory
fashion and hence was a violation of the eighth amendment, leaving
open the possibility that a non-discriminatory application of the cap-
ital punishment statutes would not be prohibited by the constitution.
The dissenting members of the court reached a contrary conclusion,
with Justice Burger finding no invidious discrimination in the ap-
plication of the death penalty, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist indicating that the decisions as to the abolition of capital
punishment was a matter for the legislative branch of government.
The Aftermath
As Justice Powell indicated in his dissent, the effect of Furman
was to invalidate the capital punishment laws of about thirty-nine
states, the District of Columbia, and numerous provisions of the United
States Criminal Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.52
In People v. Fitzpatrick,53 the New York Court of Appeals found that
under Furman that state's Penal Laws 125.35, subd. 5, which gave
the jury sole discretion to impose the death penalty if the defendant
was found guilty of killing a police officer or other peace officer in
the performance of his official duty, was invalid. Similarly, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that death sentences for all capital crimes, ex-
cept those found under §2901.09 and §2901.10 of the Ohio Revised
49 Id. at 418.
501 d. at 447.
51 Id. at 465-70.
2Id. at 417-18.
- 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1972).
1974]
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Code which impose a mandatory death sentence, were cruel and un-
usual and in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution.54 In an unconventional approach to
Furman, the North Carolina Supreme Court held unconstitutional the
mercy provision of that state's rape statute which allowed jurors to
impose a penalty less than death for first degree rape. In so doing,
they made the death penalty mandatory in all such cases and for first
degree murder, burglary, and arson as well.55
The Legislative Response
In Donaldson v. Sack,56 the Florida Supreme Court held that
Furman eliminated capital punishment from Florida law unless new
legislation revived it. The legislation was quickly forthcoming and
on December 8, 1972, Governor Askew signed a bill reviving the death
penalty, making Florida the first state to pass a post-Furman capital
punishment statute. 57 The law, a compromise between the state's House
and Senate bills, was passed by a special session of the legislature
convened on November 28, 1972 to consider the reinstatement of cap-
ital punishment.8 It provides for a bifurcated trial with the separate
sentencing proceeding to be conducted as soon as practicable by the
trial judge before the trial jury, or if there were no trial jury, one
empanelled for that purpose unless the defendant waives it. The
regular rules of evidence were suspended as both the prosecutor and
the defendant or his counsel argue for or against the sentence of
death. The jury, by majority vote, renders a sentence of life im-
prisonment or death, basing its decision upon the existence or non-
existence of the enumerated aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.5 9 The trial judge has the discretion to follow the jury's sen-
tence or not, but if he imposes death, he must render a written opinion
stating the specific aggravating circumstances found to exist, and the
absence of mitigating circumstances or that they were insufficient to
54 State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St.2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972).
55 State v. Waddell, 28 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). See also State v. Talbert, 28 N.C.
718, 194 S.E.2d 822 (1973). But see Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Furman, 408 U.S. at
401, regarding possible unconstitutionality of this approach.
56265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
7 FLA. STATS. ANN. §921.141 (West 1973) (hereinafter cited as Fla. Capital Punishment
Act).
5' Ehrhardt and Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?,
64 J. CRIM. L.C. 10, 13-15 (1973).
s9 Fla. Capital Punishment Act §9 Aggravating circumstances found at §9(6), Mitigating cir-
cumstances found at §9(7); they are similar to those found in Model Penal Code §210.6
Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as MPC].
Fla. Capital Punishment Act:
Aggravating circumstances -Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
a. The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment;
b. The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person;
(Continued on next page)
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outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 60 Both the judgment of con-
viction and the sentence of death are automatically reviewed by the
Florida Supreme Court. 1
The language of the statutory list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, such as: "the capital felony was especially heinous,
(Continued from preceding page)
c. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;
d. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destruc-
tive device or bomb;
e. The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
f. The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain;
g. The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws;
h. The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Mitigating circumstances - Mitigating Circumstances shall be the following:
a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
b. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
c. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
d. The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor;
e. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination
of another person;
f. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired;
g. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
MPC:
Aggravating Circumstances.
a. The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
b. The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person.
c. At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
d. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
e. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an ac-
complice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
f. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
g. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity.
Mitigating Circumstances.
a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
b. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
c. The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented
to the homicidal act.
d. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed
to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
e. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
f. The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
g. At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the crim-
inality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
h. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
60Id. at §9 (3).
61 Id. at §9 (5).
1974]
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atrocious or cruel,"' 2 and "the defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity, '63 has been criticized as being too vague.
Furthermore, both the jury and the judge are required to determine
if "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist" and "whether suffi-
cient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh aggravating cir-
cumstances found to exist.""4 In the opinion of two members of the
legal staff of the Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment,
this allows a considerable amount of discretion in the sentencing
process which is aggravated by the failure to specify the burden of
proof needed to establish the existence of an aggravating or mitigat-
ing factor and the weight which the judge should give the jury's
recommendation.65 The effect of this statute appears to be that the
judge now has the ultimate sentencing authority that the jury used
to have and while the United States Supreme Court in 194966 did ap-
prove a New York statute which authorized a trial judge to impose
death even though the jury recommended mercy, a Delaware67 Su-
preme Court has held such a transfer does nothing to enable a system
to pass muster under Furman.
A majority of the Florida Supreme Court has nevertheless up-
held this statute." The court interpreted Furman as not condemning
the mere presence of discretion but rather the quality of that discre-
tion and the manner in which it was used. It refuted the contention
that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were vague, find-
ing that they "are reasonable and easily understood by the average
man."' 9 The dissent argued that the use of standards was rejected in
McGautha and the standards themselves are vague. They also found
a degree of discretion in every stage of a criminal proceeding and
that the discretion formerly resting in the jury was merely transferred
to the judge.'0 The ultimate answer to this controversy, undoubtedly,
will be provided by the United States Supreme Court. 1
Florida's statute uses standards which appear to be largely based
upon those of the Model Penal Code to guide the jury and the judge
in their determination of the applicability of imposing capital punish-
621d. at §9(6) (h); this is similar to M.P.C. §210.6(3) (h).
631d. at §9(7) (a); this is similar to M.P.C. §210.6(4) (a).
"Id. at §9 (5) for the jury and §9 (3) for the judge.
65 Ehrhardt and Levinson, supra at 17-18.
6 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
67 State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972).
8 State v. Dixson, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
69 Id. at 9.
70 Id. at 17-19.
71 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973 §1 at 19 Col. 1.
[Vol. 23:172
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ment.7 The use of such standards has been recommended as a possible
means of eliminating the discretion found unconstitutional in Furman.7
As Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Furman suggests, the inclusion
of standards may not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of
discretion in sentencing.7 4 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the ma-
jority in McGautha v. California indicated that:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicide and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language
which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.75
He went on to state that:
The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would
make general standards either meaningless 'boilerplate' or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need. 76
Therefore, it can be argued that in McGautha standards were deter-
mined to be meaningless and the use of them will not eliminate the
discretion found to be offensive to the eighth amendment in Furman.
In opposition, it could be argued that McGautha was decided on due
process grounds and concerned the minimum requirement needed to
give the accused a fundamentally fair trial. Furman, on the other
hand, was decided on cruel and unusual punishment grounds and at
least three of the five opinions were based upon a showing that the
death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary manner. Consequently, it
may be found that the standards which were determined unnecessary
under due process may nevertheless alter the results of trials enough
to eliminate the arbitrariness condemned by White and Stewart. 77
Where, as in the Model Penal Code and the Florida Statute, the death
penalty can be imposed only if it is determined that at least one ag-
gravating circumstance exists and it is not oughtweighed by any
mitigating circumstances, the use of standards may be found uncon-
stitutional. But if the standards are merely to be considered by the
trier of fact, as in the new Georgia statute, S-1 (the Senate's McClellan
72 See note 64 supra.
7 Note, 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 481, 494 (1972).
74 See text at note 40 supra.
-s402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
76 Id. at 208.
7Supra note 73.
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Bill), and the original Ohio Proposed Criminal Code, 78 it would appear
that there would be little or no effect upon the discretionary sentenc-
ing process and the statute would be found unconstitutional.
Because three of the five members of the majority in Furman
based their decision upon the infrequency and capricious imposition
of the death penalty, it might be concluded that a statute with a man-
datory death penalty provision would be constitutional. However,
the constitutionality of such a statute is open to question because of
its severity."' For example, Chief Justice Burger considers mandatory
death sentences too arbitrary and doctrinaire,81 and to Mr. Justice
Blackmun, they are regressive and of an antique mold.
2
The new Ohio Criminal Code 3 and the Nixon administration's
version of the proposed federal criminal code revision" (S. 1400)
provide a procedure for the imposition of capital punishment which
combines discretionary and mandatory features. 5 In both, the decision
to impose death must follow from the determination of the existence
of an enumerated aggravating circumstance and the non-existence
of any of the enumerated mitigating circumstances.86 The Ohio statute
completely eliminates a jury determination of the death penalty. It
requires that the indictment, or a count in the indictment, contain one
or more specifications alleging the existence of one or more listed
aggravating circumstances.87 The trier of fact then must find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both the charge and
one or more of the specifications or the sentence automatically will
be life imprisonment. If a verdict of guilty to the specification is re-
turned, the penalty to be imposed is to be determined by either the
trial judge or the three-judge panel which tried the defendant upon
his waiver of jury trial. Disclosure of the mandatory pre-sentence in-
78 GA. LAwS 1973, Act. No. 74 (Committee substitute to H.H. 12); Final report of the Tech-
nical Committee to study Ohio Criminal Laws and procedures, proposed Ohio Criminal Code
§2929.02 (1971). See Comment, 24 MERCER L. REV. 930 (1973) for an evaluation of the
Georgia Statute.
79 See 408 U.S. 238, 308 (Stewart, J. concurring).
80See 13 CR. L. 2357, (1973) testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Robert G. Dixon before Senate
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures.
81 408 U.S. at 404 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
a 408 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.02-04 (Page Supp. 1973).
"4S. 1400, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. §2401-02 (1973).
8
sSee 13 CR. L. 2357 (1973).
86 OHio REV. CODE ANN. 2929.03 (Page Supp. 1973).
81 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2929.03 (Page Supp. 1973); Aggravating Circumstances as listed
in OHIO REV. CODE §2929.04(a).
A. Imposition of the Death Penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or
more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to
Section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(Continued ou next page)
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vestigation and psychiatric examination is required and there is a
hearing at which the prosecutor and the accused or his counsel may
present testimony and other evidence and argue which penalty should
be imposed. If the trial judge or panel determines that none of the
mitigating circumstances have been determined to exist by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the sentence is death.88 S. 1400 provides
for a separate sentencing hearing before the trial jury, a jury em-
panelled for the hearing, or before the court alone. The government
and the defendant are given the opportunity to present evidence
(under liberal admission standards), refute information received, and
argue as to the adequacy of information. The jury or the court is then
to return a special verdict as to the existence or non-existence of ag-
gravating or precluding (mitigating) factors.69 If, by a preponderance
(Continued from preceding page)
1. The offense was the assassination of the President of the United States or person in
line of succession to the Presidency, or of the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of this
State, or of the President-Elect or Vice President-Elect of the United States, or of the
Governor-Elect or Lieutenant Governor-Elect of this State, or of a candidate for any of
the foregoing offices. For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has
been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions
according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election,
or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election.
2. The offense was committed for hire.
3. The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension,
trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
4. The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention facility
as defined in Section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.
5. The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the gist was the
purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior to the offense at bar,
or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing
of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.
6. The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the offender knew
to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the offense, or
it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.
7. The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to com-
mit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping,
rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.03 (Page Supp. 1973), Mitigating Circumstances listed in
§2929.04.
B. Regardless of whether one or more of the Aggravating Circumstances listed in division
(A) of this Section is specified in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when considering the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender. One or
more of the following is established by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
2. It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
3. The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental de-
ficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
89S. 1400 §2401.
Sentence of Death
(a) In General- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a person who has been
found guilty of a Class A felony under section 1101 (Treason), 1111 (Sabotage), 1121
(Espionage), or 1601 (Murder), shall be sentenced to death if:
(1) the offense is under section 1101 (Treason), 1111 (Sabotage), or 1121 (Espionage)
and:
(A) the defendant has been convicted of another offense involving treason, sabotage,
or espionage, committed before the time of the offense, for which a sentence of life
imprisonment or death was imposable;
(Continued on next page)
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of the evidence, they determine that an aggravating factor exists and
that no precluding factor exists, the penalty is death.9 0 Since both of the
systems automatically impose death upon the determination that cer-
tain conditions exist or do not exist, it appears that the "discretionary
imposition" objection of Douglas, Stewart, and White in Furman has
been answered without a return to the regressive antique model of
Blackmun's fears. This, at least, is the opinion of Assistant Attorney
General Robert G. Dixon, Jr., when he claimed before the Senate Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures that S. 1400 was "con-
sistent with seven of the nine Furman opinions." 91
(Continued from preceding page)
(B) the defendant, in the commission of the offense knowingly created a grave risk of
substantial danger to the national security; or
(C) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave risk of
death to any person; or
(2) the offense is under section 1601 (Murder) and;
(A) the defendant committed the offense during the commission and attempted com-
mission, of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commis-
sion of, an offense described in section 1101 (Treason), 1111 (Sabotage), 1121
(Espionage), 1314(a) (1) (Escape), 1621 (Kidnapping), 1625 (Aircraft Hijacking),
or 1701 (Arson);
(B) the defendant has been convicted of another federal or state offense, committed
either before or at the time of the offense, for which a sentence of life imprisonment
or death was imposable;
(C) the defendant has been convicted of two or more federal or state felonies, com-
mitted on different occasions before the time of the offense, involving the infliction of
serious bodily injury upon another person;
(D) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave risk
of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense;
(E) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner;
(F) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of
payment, of anything of pecuniary value;
(G) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in ex-
pectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or
(H) the defendant committed the offense against:
(i) the President or a successor to the presidency;
(ii) a chief of state, head of government, or the political equivalent, of a foreign
nation; or a foreign dignitary who is in the United States on account of the per-
formance of his official duties; or
(iii) a United States official, a law enforcement officer, an employee of a United
States penal or correctional institution, or a federal public servant outside the
United States for the purpose of performing diplomatic duties, while performing
his official duties or on account of the performance of his official duties or because
of his status as a public servant.
(b) Imposition Precluded- Notwithstanding the existence of one or more of the factors
set forth in subsection (a) (1) or (2), the court shall not sentence the defendant to death
if, at the time of the offense:
( 1 ) the defendant was under the age of eighteen;
(2) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired as to constitute a de-
fense to prosecution;
(3) the defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress
as would constitute a defense to prosecution;
(4) the defendant was an accomplice in the offense, which was committed by another
person, and his participation was relatively minor; or
(5) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course
of the murder for which he was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of
causing, death to any person.
90S. 1400 §2402 (d).
91 Supra note 85.
[Vol. 23 :172
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FURMAN
On the other hand, Louis B. Schwartz, Director of the National
Commission of Reform of Federal Criminal Law, believes that the
listed aggravating circumstances are arbitrary and vague.92 Schwartz
also feels that the "mandatory" scheme will merely shift the discre-
tion from the judge and jury to the prosecutor and the president (or
governor) who has the power to commute sentences or pardon. He
fears that prosecutors may use this discretion as a club to force deals
in plea bargaining. 93 In United States v. Jackson,9 the Supreme Court
struck down the Federal Kidnapping Act 95 which provided no pro-
cedure for imposing the death penalty upon one who waived jury trial
or plead guilty. They claimed that it had an unnecessarily chilling
effect on the fifth amendment right not to plead guilty and the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial. It could be argued that by encourag-
ing guilty pleas with the threat of death, the effect of these statutes
is the same and therefore they are unconstitutional. However, the
court has upheld guilty pleas made by an individual charged under
the same or similar statutes96 from collateral attack contesting their
voluntariness. In Brady, the court, per Mr. Justice White, held:
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas
of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence
are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are
invalid whether involuntary or not.97
The Court went on to interpret Jackson as merely prohibiting the im-
position of the death penalty under that type of statute. With the
Burger Court's strong support for the practice of "plea bargaining""
it would appear that the best approach would be to argue that the
effect of the new "mandatory" capital punishment statutes is merely
to transfer the discretion from the jury to the prosecutor and that
this is not enough to comply with Furman.99
92 Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 13 CRIM. L. REP. 3271. E. 1400 provides
that murder is a capital offense if committed in the course of espionage, kidnapping, arson,
or in a specially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, but that it is not capital when com-
mitted in the course of robbery, burglary, or rape.
9Supra note 92.
14 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
95 Act of June 22, 1932, Ch. 271, §1, 3, 47 Stat. 326; Act of May 18, 1934, Ch. 301, 48 Star.
782. The currently in force Federal Kidnapping Statute which does not authorize any death
penalty is found in 18 U.S.C. §1201 (1972).
96Brady v. United States, 398 U.S. 742 (1970), defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. §1201;
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), defendant charged under state statute which
permitted imposition of the death penalty only after not guilty plea and trial.
97 397 U.S. 742, 747.
"See Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-1 (1971); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
"Cf. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 770 (Del. 1973) (dictum).
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The Chief Justice, dissenting in Furman, concluded the use of
standards will not alter the discretionary character of a capital punish-
ment system. 100 The development of usable standards was considered
beyond present human ability in McGautha.101 Therefore, the require-
ment that the death penalty must follow the finding of the existence
of an aggravating circumstance and the nonexistence of any mitigat-
ing circumstance may not satisfy the requirements of Furman. The
problem of "jury nullification" (where a jury refuses to return a
conviction no matter what evidence is introduced if it disagrees with
the punishment) has long been recognized 02 The jury may, under
both the Ohio statute and the proposed Federal statute, arbitrarily
refuse to find the existence of aggravating circumstances, and under
S. 1400 declare the existence of a mitigating circumstance for reasons
of its own. Jury nullification will occur even under the most carefully
constructed statute. In the Ohio statute, the legislature seems to be
using insufficient criminal defenses as mitigating circumstances.1 0 3 For
example, even though provocation in a given instance may not be
great enough to reduce the charges to manslaughter, it may be a
mitigating factor which would result in a sentence of life imprison-
ment rather than death for a conviction of murder.
Both statutes may circuitously work their way back into the ob-
jections of Douglas, White and Stewart in Furman. It may be possible
to show that the pattern of the imposition of capital sentences has
not been greatly changed under these statutes. Justice Brennan con-
sidered infrequency of imposition as strong evidence of arbitrari-
ness ;104 White found that a seldom-inflicted punishment as severe as
death would be unjustified by the social ends it was deemed to serve.105
For these and other reasons"6 , a statute which appears to satisfy
Furman may in its application fail to pass constitutional muster.
0 7
Finally, the constitutionality of capital punishment itself may
be attacked. Brennan and Marshall found it unconstitutional in all
100 See text at note 45 supra.
101 See text at note 75 supra.
102 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1971).
103 See mitigating circumstances at note 88, supra.
104408 U.S. 238, 290-95 (1972).
105 Id at 311-12.
106 See, e.g., Douglas' argument that a penalty which is imposed on the poor, the sick, the
ignorant, the powerless, and the hated may violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-56 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
107 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886) where a statute which was valid on its
face was found to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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circumstances, and Stewart"8 and White1' 9 both indicated that the
arguments advanced by Brennan and Marshall were strong. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas seems to condemn the sentencing sys-
tem rather than the punishment. However, Mr. Justice Rehnquist in
his dissenting opinion included Douglas with Brennan and Marshall
as one who would find all capital punishment laws unconstitutional. 110
Some commentators have indicated that Douglas, Stewart, and
White wrote their opinions in Furman with the intent to condemn
and to focus upon arbitrary, freakish, or discriminatory exercises of
discretion within the entire criminal justice system, and that in the
future each of these three justices may be prepared to vote against
capital punishment irrespective of the system under which it is
administered.
It has been suggested that some of the dissenters may, in a future
case, bend to the precedent of Furman and vote against any new
imposition of capital punishment; moreover, it does seem unlikely
that the Supreme Court, after releasing over six hundred prisoners
from death row, would permit the reinstatement of capital punish-
ment in any form."'
Carol Irvint
Howard E. Rosett
101408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) "For these and other reasons, at least two of my Brothers have
concluded that the infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all
circumstances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Their case is a srong one."
(Emphasis added.)
1 0 Id. at 465.
1 Ehrhart, Hubbart, Levinson, Smiley, Wills, The Future of Capital Punishment in Florida: An
Analysis and Recommendations, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 2, 7 (1973).
t Law Review Editor; second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
tt Law Review Editor; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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